Materialism vs. Substance Dualism
In this paper, I will outline David Papineau’s argument for materialism and Richard Swinburne’s argument for substance dualism. I will then compare these two opposing theories, and argue the superiority of materialism over substance dualism.
David Papineau is a materialist who is concerned with the unknown connection between the mind and the brain. Materialism states that the effects that are normally attributed to conscious, or mental, causes also have full physical causes. These two causes overlap or have identical properties since it would be absurd to have an effect caused twice. His example to illustrate his argument explains that he would move to the fridge for a beer if he consciously felt thirsty and that their must be a physical process that accompanies this thirst. Papineau’s argument is constructed through three premisses. The first states, “conscious mental occurrences have physical effects (Papineau, 271).” This mainly states that our conscious feelings and other mental states cause our physical behavior. The second premiss states, “All physical effects are fully caused by purely physical prior histories (Papineau, 271).” This quote pertains to the “completeness of physics,” that Papineau deals with later on in the argument. This premiss outlines that physical behavior is caused by a chain of physical actions that occur in the body, Such as the physical contraction of muscles caused by the physical event of neurons firing throughout the brain and body. These two premisses suggest that physical effects can have two distinct causes: one being a mental cause and the other a physical cause. Yet, this implies a sense of overdeterminism, which is not always plausible. Overdeterminism is the theory that if an effect has two distinct causes, that effect would still be produced if one of those causes were absent. Papineau finds this to be highly unlikely considering his thirst example saying, “… Would [I] still have walked to the fridge even if I hadn’t felt thirsty (because my neurons were firing)… (Papineau, 271)?”
This leads to Papineau’s final premiss of the argument. “The physical effects of a conscious cause and a physical cause aren’t always overdetermined by distinct causes (Papineau, 271).” Placed together with the other premisses, Papineau argues that a physical effect has a conscious cause and physical cause and that these two causes are not distinct. From this statement, we understand that at some point the properties of a conscious cause and the properties of a physical cause must overlap. From here, Papineau states that he does not know where to find this point of overlap, but with certifiable data, it should be possible to determine the relation between these causes and when these relations occur. By investigating this claim, it would be seen that these causes are not just related but some aspects must be identical.
Papineau admits that all of his premisses can be denied but the consequences of these denials seem more outrageous. The first premiss can be denied by “pre-established harmony,” suggesting that either God has created the illusion of conscious and physical causes simultaneously happening, or “epiphenomenalism,” where the physical causes of the brain can influence the conscious causes of the mind, but not in the other direction. Epiphenomenalism is more credible in this regard since it does not rely on the teleological approach and it respects the “completeness of physics” where nothing immaterial can influence the physical brain. Papineau points out that if this theory were true, it would create a ‘causal dangler,’ an independent state that produces a cause but no effect (Papineau, 273). Between the two, ordinary science would prefer the simpler theory of materialism to epiphenomenalism.
Papineau’s second premiss is questioned over its adherence to the completeness of physics. He backs his claim that despite the fragile history of this theory’s validity, there is recent evidence that supports it. It has been shown that most natural phenomena are attributed to a few fundamental forces (Papineau, 275). With recent physiological discoveries of the neuronal network, DNA and biochemical cycles, the special forces attributed to these mental causes have not shown any trace of existence. This proves that either modern science has failed in detecting them or that these powers are beyond natural recognition. However, with now almost 50 years of supporting research and evidence it is hard to deny modern science’s established theory.
The final premiss of David Papineau’s materialist argument concerns the problem of overdetermination. In regards to the example of becoming thirsty and getting a drink, overdetermination implies that one would retrieve a drink without the notion of thirst or without the physical event of neuron’s firing in the brain. While this seems unlikely, philosophers have defended this theory by stating that the different causes are counterfactually dependant. Yet, the important reliance factor of this mechanism is not found elsewhere in nature, which according to Ockham’s Razor would suggest that it is not a plausible theory.
In contrast to David Papineau’s questionable materialism, Richard Swinburne presents the argument of substance dualism. Substance Dualism is based on the notion that humans and higher animals are conscious and the thoughts and feelings that accompany consciousness cannot be a property of the physical body. There must be a link that connects these mental properties to the physical body, which Swinburne designates a “soul.” (Swinburne, 263)
Dualism is based on the argument that the world consists of substances, such as a chair or bone or rock, and that when these substances have a property at a certain time it is called an event. A property is designated as the color, shape or relative distance of an object to another object. Anything that has a property and can cause an event is a substance. There also are substances that do not occupy volumes of space that he designates “immaterial substances (Swinburne, 263).”
Swinburne explains that history is a sequence of events that can be divided into two groups. Properties and events can be either physical or mental. Physical events are considered public, as every person is able to witness the event, of which everyone has an equal interpretation[1]. Even if someone witnesses the event of a brown table in private, the desk is available for anyone else to find and check. Also included in physical events are brain events. With modern technology, the firing of neurons in the brain can be witnessed and recorded by any observer. In opposition to these events are mental events that occur privately in the mind of a person through experience. Some of these events include the interpretation of a colour, the feeling of pain or any thoughts or feelings. While others can witness these events through behavioral patterns that are produced, the subject still has higher knowledge of the experience that is unknown to the observer[2]. Therefore, mental states must be different from brain events and other bodily events.
Brain states can cause mental states and vice versa. If the regular brain states are disrupted due to some form of trauma, mental states are often affected. However, mental states such as pain from your hand in fire can cause brain states, as neurons fire and your hand is unconsciously withdrawn from the flame by instinct. These separate states must be connected by some link. Swinburne suggests that this link is an immaterial substance, known as a soul.
If there was not a soul or immaterial substance that joined these two states together then all we would have to create, our history would be the knowledge of what material substances were created and which were destroyed. Yet Swinburne criticizes this notion by using three thought experiments. These experiments indicate that if a brain operation occurs, the patient is unable to know what will happen to the nature of their current mental states. While they can be sure of what will happen to their brain, the result of their identity endowed with its specific characteristics is unknown[3]. These experiments showed that despite having complete knowledge of the physical consequences, it is impossible to explain what happens to the immaterial substance, or soul.
Swinburne does not believe that every organism that has a brain has a soul, simply those that have the ability to produce thoughts and feelings have an immaterial soul. This is most evidently seen by which animals can experience the sensation of pain. The immaterial souls of these animals were created by through evolution due to the brain’s complexities that caused the existence of a soul and the continuing development and operation of that soul[4]. This displays the causal link that exists between the soul and the brain. Events in a specific brain act upon the events in a specific soul and vice versa. It is unknown at what point this stage of soul creation occurred so many scientists disregard the notion of a soul. Swinburne suggests that simply disavowing a theory based on a lack of explanation is a mistake.
While I agree that it is a mistake to disregard something based on a lack of clarity, I also find that it is hard to accept a theory that does not try to support itself through verifiable evidence. While materialism can be contradicted, the idea that it would be possible to discover the link between identical properties through enough research seems more promising than the existence of a soul. Papineau’s argument that conscious causes and physical causes produce physical effects through identical properties seems more likely than the fact that an immaterial substance as the soul links these causes together. Papineau argues that a claim is presented and only research is required to determine how these two areas are linked together. This is a scientific based query whereas Swinburne relies on faith and belief that this immaterial substance exists.
Another reason why I accept materialism over dualism is the believability of the suggested materialist thought experiments. It is easier for me to establish my own reasons for eating when I am hungry than to think of the performing actions of my soul. When I make myself a sandwich, I can realize the cause as being from my sudden desire for food and that since my stomach was empty, a chemical process occurred which alerted my brain through muscle contractions in my stomach and a possible grumbling noise. Combined with my feeling these contractions and the hearing of the grumbling, I realize that my stomach is empty and think back to when I last ate. Also, if I am sad or thinking that I should be on a diet or am eating less to save money, as a student at university often does, I might choose not to eat despite my body’s grumbling. I then decide based on my feelings of whether I am in the mood to eat or not, combined with my body’s physical display of a requirement of food. This displays that my actions of eating are based on a physical event as well as a mental event.
In this paper, I have outlined Richard Swinburne’s article, “A Defense of Substance Dualism,” and David Papineau’s argument entitled, “The Case for Materialism.” By viewing these opposing theories, I have argued that effects require a physical and a mental cause, proving materialism’s superiority over dualism.
[1] Swinburne, 263.
[2] Swinburne, 264.
[3] Swinburne, 265.
[4] Swinburne, 266.
David Papineau is a materialist who is concerned with the unknown connection between the mind and the brain. Materialism states that the effects that are normally attributed to conscious, or mental, causes also have full physical causes. These two causes overlap or have identical properties since it would be absurd to have an effect caused twice. His example to illustrate his argument explains that he would move to the fridge for a beer if he consciously felt thirsty and that their must be a physical process that accompanies this thirst. Papineau’s argument is constructed through three premisses. The first states, “conscious mental occurrences have physical effects (Papineau, 271).” This mainly states that our conscious feelings and other mental states cause our physical behavior. The second premiss states, “All physical effects are fully caused by purely physical prior histories (Papineau, 271).” This quote pertains to the “completeness of physics,” that Papineau deals with later on in the argument. This premiss outlines that physical behavior is caused by a chain of physical actions that occur in the body, Such as the physical contraction of muscles caused by the physical event of neurons firing throughout the brain and body. These two premisses suggest that physical effects can have two distinct causes: one being a mental cause and the other a physical cause. Yet, this implies a sense of overdeterminism, which is not always plausible. Overdeterminism is the theory that if an effect has two distinct causes, that effect would still be produced if one of those causes were absent. Papineau finds this to be highly unlikely considering his thirst example saying, “… Would [I] still have walked to the fridge even if I hadn’t felt thirsty (because my neurons were firing)… (Papineau, 271)?”
This leads to Papineau’s final premiss of the argument. “The physical effects of a conscious cause and a physical cause aren’t always overdetermined by distinct causes (Papineau, 271).” Placed together with the other premisses, Papineau argues that a physical effect has a conscious cause and physical cause and that these two causes are not distinct. From this statement, we understand that at some point the properties of a conscious cause and the properties of a physical cause must overlap. From here, Papineau states that he does not know where to find this point of overlap, but with certifiable data, it should be possible to determine the relation between these causes and when these relations occur. By investigating this claim, it would be seen that these causes are not just related but some aspects must be identical.
Papineau admits that all of his premisses can be denied but the consequences of these denials seem more outrageous. The first premiss can be denied by “pre-established harmony,” suggesting that either God has created the illusion of conscious and physical causes simultaneously happening, or “epiphenomenalism,” where the physical causes of the brain can influence the conscious causes of the mind, but not in the other direction. Epiphenomenalism is more credible in this regard since it does not rely on the teleological approach and it respects the “completeness of physics” where nothing immaterial can influence the physical brain. Papineau points out that if this theory were true, it would create a ‘causal dangler,’ an independent state that produces a cause but no effect (Papineau, 273). Between the two, ordinary science would prefer the simpler theory of materialism to epiphenomenalism.
Papineau’s second premiss is questioned over its adherence to the completeness of physics. He backs his claim that despite the fragile history of this theory’s validity, there is recent evidence that supports it. It has been shown that most natural phenomena are attributed to a few fundamental forces (Papineau, 275). With recent physiological discoveries of the neuronal network, DNA and biochemical cycles, the special forces attributed to these mental causes have not shown any trace of existence. This proves that either modern science has failed in detecting them or that these powers are beyond natural recognition. However, with now almost 50 years of supporting research and evidence it is hard to deny modern science’s established theory.
The final premiss of David Papineau’s materialist argument concerns the problem of overdetermination. In regards to the example of becoming thirsty and getting a drink, overdetermination implies that one would retrieve a drink without the notion of thirst or without the physical event of neuron’s firing in the brain. While this seems unlikely, philosophers have defended this theory by stating that the different causes are counterfactually dependant. Yet, the important reliance factor of this mechanism is not found elsewhere in nature, which according to Ockham’s Razor would suggest that it is not a plausible theory.
In contrast to David Papineau’s questionable materialism, Richard Swinburne presents the argument of substance dualism. Substance Dualism is based on the notion that humans and higher animals are conscious and the thoughts and feelings that accompany consciousness cannot be a property of the physical body. There must be a link that connects these mental properties to the physical body, which Swinburne designates a “soul.” (Swinburne, 263)
Dualism is based on the argument that the world consists of substances, such as a chair or bone or rock, and that when these substances have a property at a certain time it is called an event. A property is designated as the color, shape or relative distance of an object to another object. Anything that has a property and can cause an event is a substance. There also are substances that do not occupy volumes of space that he designates “immaterial substances (Swinburne, 263).”
Swinburne explains that history is a sequence of events that can be divided into two groups. Properties and events can be either physical or mental. Physical events are considered public, as every person is able to witness the event, of which everyone has an equal interpretation[1]. Even if someone witnesses the event of a brown table in private, the desk is available for anyone else to find and check. Also included in physical events are brain events. With modern technology, the firing of neurons in the brain can be witnessed and recorded by any observer. In opposition to these events are mental events that occur privately in the mind of a person through experience. Some of these events include the interpretation of a colour, the feeling of pain or any thoughts or feelings. While others can witness these events through behavioral patterns that are produced, the subject still has higher knowledge of the experience that is unknown to the observer[2]. Therefore, mental states must be different from brain events and other bodily events.
Brain states can cause mental states and vice versa. If the regular brain states are disrupted due to some form of trauma, mental states are often affected. However, mental states such as pain from your hand in fire can cause brain states, as neurons fire and your hand is unconsciously withdrawn from the flame by instinct. These separate states must be connected by some link. Swinburne suggests that this link is an immaterial substance, known as a soul.
If there was not a soul or immaterial substance that joined these two states together then all we would have to create, our history would be the knowledge of what material substances were created and which were destroyed. Yet Swinburne criticizes this notion by using three thought experiments. These experiments indicate that if a brain operation occurs, the patient is unable to know what will happen to the nature of their current mental states. While they can be sure of what will happen to their brain, the result of their identity endowed with its specific characteristics is unknown[3]. These experiments showed that despite having complete knowledge of the physical consequences, it is impossible to explain what happens to the immaterial substance, or soul.
Swinburne does not believe that every organism that has a brain has a soul, simply those that have the ability to produce thoughts and feelings have an immaterial soul. This is most evidently seen by which animals can experience the sensation of pain. The immaterial souls of these animals were created by through evolution due to the brain’s complexities that caused the existence of a soul and the continuing development and operation of that soul[4]. This displays the causal link that exists between the soul and the brain. Events in a specific brain act upon the events in a specific soul and vice versa. It is unknown at what point this stage of soul creation occurred so many scientists disregard the notion of a soul. Swinburne suggests that simply disavowing a theory based on a lack of explanation is a mistake.
While I agree that it is a mistake to disregard something based on a lack of clarity, I also find that it is hard to accept a theory that does not try to support itself through verifiable evidence. While materialism can be contradicted, the idea that it would be possible to discover the link between identical properties through enough research seems more promising than the existence of a soul. Papineau’s argument that conscious causes and physical causes produce physical effects through identical properties seems more likely than the fact that an immaterial substance as the soul links these causes together. Papineau argues that a claim is presented and only research is required to determine how these two areas are linked together. This is a scientific based query whereas Swinburne relies on faith and belief that this immaterial substance exists.
Another reason why I accept materialism over dualism is the believability of the suggested materialist thought experiments. It is easier for me to establish my own reasons for eating when I am hungry than to think of the performing actions of my soul. When I make myself a sandwich, I can realize the cause as being from my sudden desire for food and that since my stomach was empty, a chemical process occurred which alerted my brain through muscle contractions in my stomach and a possible grumbling noise. Combined with my feeling these contractions and the hearing of the grumbling, I realize that my stomach is empty and think back to when I last ate. Also, if I am sad or thinking that I should be on a diet or am eating less to save money, as a student at university often does, I might choose not to eat despite my body’s grumbling. I then decide based on my feelings of whether I am in the mood to eat or not, combined with my body’s physical display of a requirement of food. This displays that my actions of eating are based on a physical event as well as a mental event.
In this paper, I have outlined Richard Swinburne’s article, “A Defense of Substance Dualism,” and David Papineau’s argument entitled, “The Case for Materialism.” By viewing these opposing theories, I have argued that effects require a physical and a mental cause, proving materialism’s superiority over dualism.
[1] Swinburne, 263.
[2] Swinburne, 264.
[3] Swinburne, 265.
[4] Swinburne, 266.
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